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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) need to acquire donor funding to carry out projects. 
In the past, NGOs used to be progressive agents for social change. Nowadays, they are 
described as part of the development machine. The dependency of NGOs on donors and the 
competition between NGOs are both increasing. Donors also expect more reports from NGOs 
on projects. Altogether, the challenge for NGOs to get funding is increasing. At least, that is 
what the existing academic literature states. 
This research will examine these challenges for NGOs in the relation with donors for 
funding. It will answer the following research question: ‘What do Dutch NGOs see as the 
biggest challenge in the funding system with donors?’ The research will focus on the level of 
accountability, competition between NGOs for donor funding and dependency on donor 
funding. To answer the research question, a qualitative case study approach on Dutch NGOs 
was chosen. Semi-structured interviews with employees from Dutch NGOs were scheduled to 
gather data. This data explains how the three factors are perceived by the employees from Dutch 
NGOs and if this accords to the existing literature. 
The findings showed that the respondents from the NGOs did not unanimously express one 
of these three factors as burdensome. However, the respondents from the NGOs did express 
that the bureaucratic element in accountability is considered as the most challenging. Especially 
smaller NGOs (NGOs with less than 100 employees) experience the demanding reports as 
problematic. It increases the workload, which limits implementation time of the projects.  
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1. Introduction 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been highly visible in solving humanitarian 
crises in the developing world. During the 1970s and 1980s interests in NGOs have arisen “in 
response to failure of state-led development approaches” (Lewis, 2012: 502). During that time, 
NGOs played important roles in assisting development aid. “The most powerful engine of 
change is the relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors” (Mathews, 1997: 50). 
Soon after, NGOs and states began to cooperate to solve large-scale humanitarian issues. 
Nowadays the influence of NGOs has drastically increased, because NGOs bring more 
expertise to development aid than governments (ibid.: 53).  
The number of NGOs has also increased globally since 1950 (Turner, 2010: 81). Turner 
(2010) examined the rise of International NGOs (INGOs). He gives two explanations for the 
increase in number of INGOs. The first explanation is the increasing demand for INGOS 
(Turner, 2010: 81). Global issues have increased and INGOs respond to them with services. 
The second explanation indicates technological changes that made it easier for INGOs to 
operate (ibid.: 82). Turner (2010) made a table on the number INGOs since 1950. The number 
of INGOs has known a high growth since 1950 (see table 1). 
 
Table 1. Number of INGOs since 1950s.*  
Number at Decade End  
 
Total INGOs 
1950 832 
1960 1,268 
1970 3,379 
1980 9,396 
1990 17,419 
2006 27,472 
* Reprinted from “Why has the number of international non-governmental organizations exploded 
since 1960?.” Turner, E. 2010, Cliodynamics, 1(1), p.82 
 
The rise of NGOs could contribute to the problem-solving of many critical issues. Until the 
1980s, many NGOs could implement their own development programmes (Lewis, 2012: 502).  
However, the increasing number of NGOs also resulted in growing skepticism on NGOs. 
Tortajada (2016) states that NGOs were criticized on “accountability, transparency and ability 
to address equity concerns” (ibid.: 272). The criticism on NGOs expanded to performance and 
credibility. “Rather than a ‘choice and voice’ for the people, NGOs are now often regarded as 
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primarily supportive of themselves and their agenda, along with that of their donors in many 
occasions” (ibid.: 272). They still remain important actors in global development, but they are 
receiving more critique than before when they were not criticized at all (ibid.: 272). 
NGOs get funding from donors in order to execute programmes. Receiving funding 
from donors has changed over time. NGOs obtain donations from multiple sources. These 
sources can differ from institutional organizations (governmental funding), to donations from 
companies or individuals. To get funding and more importantly to get long-term funding from 
institutional and commercial donors is what Edwards and Hulme (1996) described as the 
‘Achilles heel’ of NGOs. Getting competent funding is crucial for NGOs to implement 
programmes. However, NGOs do not just get funding, donors expect something in return.  
Consequently, an increase in critique on NGOs can lead to donors feeling more reluctant to 
supply funding.   
Literature shows that three factors can be distinguished in the relationship between NGO 
and donors: accountability, competition and dependency (Baur & Schmitz, 2012). Several 
scholars state that NGOs are facing more difficulty to receive funding, because of an increase 
in accountability, competition and dependency on donors. According to Hólmen (2010) 
increasing competition overshadows smaller and new NGOs by the larger and well-known 
NGOs (ibid.: 211). Moreover, donors can stop to support NGOs’ missions, so NGOs cannot 
continue to operate their mission. This can affect the region where NGOs are working in (ibid.: 
211). Dependency on financial aid by donors forces NGOs to be accountable to the donors 
instead to the people they help (ibid.: 214). If NGOs experience an increase in accountability, 
competition and dependency it can result in less effective development aid (ibid.: 211). These 
three factors have changed over time. Srinivas (2015) states that increasing accountability leads 
to better results in international development and that it leaves room for innovation and more 
effectiveness. Also, Parks (2008) expresses that increasing competition results in more 
sufficient accountability. 
This research will examine the challenges that NGOs experience in the funding relation 
with donors. It will give answer to the research question: ‘What do Dutch NGOs see as the 
biggest challenge in the funding system with donors?’ To answer the question, the research will 
first define NGOs, donors and donor funding. Second, it will give an overview on how 
accountability, competition and dependency are viewed in academic literature. After the 
literature review, the methodology will be described. Data will be gathered by qualitative case 
studies on Dutch NGOs. Semi-structured interviews with employees from Dutch NGOs will 
give insights in how these three factors are experienced in practice, and if they match with the 
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portrayal in literature. The NGOs vary in size, familiarity and social thematic focus. The 
findings of the interviews will be discussed in chapter 4. Also, to answer the research question, 
three sub questions will be discussed in the form of three hypotheses. The three sub questions 
are: 
 
1. How do NGOs experience accountability to their donors? 
2. How do NGOs experience competition with other NGOs? 
3. How do NGOs experience dependency from donors? 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the findings and relates it to the existing literature. Also, the limitations of 
the research and the recommendations will be further discussed. Lastly, the answer on the 
research question will be given in chapter 6: ‘Conclusion’. 
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2. Literature Review 
The first part of the literature review defines the terms: NGOs, donors and donor funding. The 
second part discusses donor funding by focusing on accountability, competition and 
dependency.  
 
2.1 NGOs, donors and donor funding 
2.1.1 What are NGOs? 
Nongovernmental organizations, NGOs for short, were officially acknowledged by the United 
Nations (UN) in 1945 as international specialized agencies (Willets, 2002: 1). Hilhorst (2003) 
explains that NGOs were needed, because the state could not solve foreign aid problems alone. 
The pursuit of NGOs was to fill the gaps created by withdrawal of governmental control under 
pressure of neoliberal reform policies (ibid.: 3). Many scholars state that there is no univocal 
definition of what the term ‘NGO’ carries (Green and Matthias, 1997; Ahmed and Potter, 2006; 
Willets, 2002). Ahmed and Potter (2006) define NGOs by using the UN definition: “Any 
international organization which is not established by inter-governmental agreement shall be 
considered as an NGO” (ibid.: 8). NGOs cannot make profit and cannot advocate the use of 
violence. It cannot be a school, university or political party (ibid.: 8).  Willetts (2002) agrees 
with this definition, but sets out the term NGO in more detail. First, an NGO must be 
independent from government control. Second, an NGO cannot be part of a political party. 
Third, an NGO is non-profitmaking, it must be non-violent and it cannot be a criminal group 
(ibid.:2). Willets (2002) defines an NGO as: “an independent voluntary association of people 
acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving 
government office, making money or illegal activities” (ibid.: 2).  
NGOs can operate on different levels, ranging from local, provincial, national, regional 
to global. Willets (2002) explains that these levels are not static, but often overlap and 
collaborate. For instance, national NGOs can focus on international levels or contain regional 
groups of countries (ibid.: 6). National NGOs can also engage in transnational development and 
humanitarian actions, but are not active players in international diplomacy (ibid.: 6).  If national 
NGOs want to gain political influence on a global level, they have to work together with 
international NGOs (ibid.: 6).  
NGOs are organizations, founded by members, that are driven by a ‘mission’ or ‘issue’ 
(ibid.: 6). These missions and issues have a normative nature and are motivated by a present 
disparity that members of an NGO experience (ibid.: 6). NGOs differ in their issues-approach. 
They can be single-issue focused on one particular topic or they want to tackle an entire field, 
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such as human rights or poverty. People become members of an NGO, because they share the 
same values that they would like “to convey to the rest of the world” (ibid.: 6). “Finding an 
audience that is receptive to ‘the issue’ and willing to adapt its behavior in line with the issue’s 
perceived requirements is the primary concern of NGOs” (ibid.: 6).  
 
2.1.2. Donors & donor funding 
Even though NGOs are non-profitmaking and financial gain is not their main priority, the 
revenue model of NGOs is based on donations. Donors provide those donations. The Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2006) lists and 
categorizes the different types of donors and donations they can encounter. This has resulted in 
a variety of donors ranging from individuals, to companies and to institutional agencies. 
NGOs need donor funding in order to pursue their missions or issues, according to 
Srinivas (2015). The issues and missions that NGOs believe in, also have to appeal to the public 
and donor organizations. Donor funding is usually short-term funding and it is gained externally 
by the NGO. Investments, on the other hand, are long-term sources of funding and are 
controlled internally by the NGO (Srinivas, 2015) in terms of time, money, and progress.  
 
2.1.3. The relation between NGOs and donors 
NGOs are heavily reliant on funding from donors. They have to reach their own targets from 
their programmes and projects, but target-reaching extends to donors as well. Srinivas (2015) 
explains the relation between donors and NGOs: “NGOs need to link their needs to specific 
donor priorities, and not send out a generic fund request that is same for every donor.” Srinivas 
(2015) discusses that donors are dependent on NGOs as well, since NGOs can assist donors in 
understanding their own missions, and to plan their specific needs to reach their goals. Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) (1995) discusses the reasons why donors need NGOs. First, 
donors use NGOs to support their own emergencies and missions. Second, NGOs can reach the 
field more effectively than official donor programmes. NGOs are able to work efficiently and 
closely with locals and do not have to reach these groups by using local governmental help. For 
this reason, donors approach NGOs to help them achieve their own missions. Third, NGOs can 
attain certain goals without being influenced by, for example, corrupt governments or 
inefficient policies (ibid.: 2). Because NGOs are so closely aligned with the region they can 
bring a certain level of expertise to the field that donors cannot. Concluding, donors need NGOs 
and NGOs need donors. 
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The second part of the literature review focuses on three topics that NGOs encounter in the 
funding relation with donors: accountability, competition and dependency.  
 
2.2 Accountability 
Accountability is the “right to require an account, and the right to impose sanction if the account 
or the action accounted for are inadequate” (Leat 1988). The concepts differ from responsibility, 
because when someone is responsible they take the blame when things go wrong. 
Accountability is the need to explain what went wrong (Oliver and Drewry, 1996: 13). It can 
be internal (to the NGO itself) and external (to donor organizations and individuals). 
Accountability frameworks help NGOs write reports on their project, and share information to 
donors on exactly how their money is being used (Deloffre, 2016). Accountability also carries 
responsibility to the organization itself, because the NGO can learn from its mistakes.  
There are two types of accountability: upward accountability and downward 
accountability. Upward accountability concerns on the relationships with donors. The NGO is 
in upward accountability accountable up the donors (Edwards & Hulme 1996; Najam 1996; 
Ebrahim 2005; Wenar 2006; Kilby 2006; Carman 2010). Downward accountability focuses on 
the relationships with groups that provide services to NGOs. NGOs are accountable to 
customers, benefiaries and organizational chain (Edwards & Hulme 1996; Najam 1996; 
Ebrahim 2005; Wenar 2006; Kilby 2006; Carman 2010). This research will focus on upward 
accountability. 
 
2.2.1. The obstacles of accountability 
NGOs have been criticized for limited impact and for their lack of accountability (Parks, 2008: 
218).  NGOs rely on donors for financial resources, and donors need to protect their interests 
and intentions (Edwards & Hulme, 1998: 5). This situation compels NGOs to focus on upward 
accountability to donors. Traditional accountability prevented NGOs to learn from their 
mistakes, because donors just cared about the successes and on how their money was spent 
(Ebrahim 2005). Current accountability encourages openness to report failures. Both donors as 
well as NGOs experience an increase in accountability (Ebrahim 2005). Donors demand 
effective use of resources and “promote corporate practices as a means of increasing the 
effectiveness of NGOs” (Pallotta 2008; Edwards 2010). 
 The principal-agent theory criticizes the concept of accountability (Gailmard, 2012). 
The theory explains that accountability creates a situation where a principal delegates the 
activities to an agent. In this case the principal is the donor and the agent the NGO. “Agents are 
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expected to hide the information that principals require to monitor their performance and, thus, 
incentives and sanctions are needed to induce agents to effectively deliver the desired type and 
level of performance” (ibid.: 8). NGOs can see accountability as a form of punishment, because 
they do not know how the donor will react to failures in the program. The principal-agent theory 
also implies that accountability is an instrument of power. Power accountability, as it is called, 
is about the difference between those who call for an account and those who have to take 
account for their actions (ibid.: 4). Prevailing approaches to accountability, in which short-term 
demonstrations of “success” are rewarded with funds, serve to reinforce this perception.  This 
power-struggle and increased pressure from donors can result into the misuse of accountability 
by NGOs as well.  
“It increases the likelihood of co-optation and compromise the independence of NGOs” 
(Baur & Schmitz, 2011: 8). Even though accountability has increased and NGOs are more 
transparent in sharing information, it can lead to manipulation of information. NGOs feel 
pressured to write multiple and positive reports. Especially smaller NGOs that do not have the 
work force to write multiple reports for multiple donors, suffer from these requests (ibid.: 9). 
This has the consequence that NGOs try to find more efficient and less-expensive uses of 
reporting. NGOs can share their reports of their activities on websites or magazines; “We 
produce a glossy report that looks like we have achieved loads, but it is really quite thin in 
reality” (Cavill & Sohail, 2007: 12). 
Increasing accountability can result to a decline of perceived trustworthiness from 
donors (Keating & Thrandardottir, 2017: 136). Trustworthiness appears when “one party has a 
positive expectation; the other party will fulfil agreements where there is the possibility of a 
loss to the first party if the second party defects” (ibid.: 136). When donors have positive 
expectations of trustworthiness, they expect that their resources will be used in an efficient and 
effective manner by the NGO.  
 
2.2.2. The benefits of accountability 
Accountability also has a positive influence. Both Kreidler (2011) and Ebrahim (2003) explain 
that accountability is one of biggest improvements for NGOs and donors. “Accountability for 
NGOs is the means through which individuals and organizations are held externally to account 
for their actions and (…) the means by which they take internal responsibility for continuously 
shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals, and performance’’ (Ebrahim 2003: 
194). “It helps NGOs to see and present their work in relation to global agendas set far away” 
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(Wallace 2004: 214). Accountability can create a cooperation that enables NGOs to cope with 
the multiple demands of their donors (Edwards and Hulme, 1994: 18-22). 
Accountability is often linked with transparency, if NGOs are more financially 
transparent, it creates a better trust image. Theorists express that accountability adds to an 
increased positive public image for NGOs. It is said that accountability creates a “win-win” 
situation because accountability increases transparency. When both parties are more transparent 
they are more accountable for their actions and that creates public scrutiny, “their overall impact 
on society should improve over time” (Ebrahim, 2003: 193).  
Donors can greatly influence NGOs, because it can sharpen NGOs on business 
practices. NGOs can help donors as they “partially compensate for diminished governmental 
capacities in advancing human rights and environmental protection” (Baur & Schmitz, 2007: 
9).  Moreover, increased accountability can create a better cooperation between donors and 
NGOs. It is assumed that accountability creates responsibility for both NGOs and donors 
(Ebrahim, 2003: 194). Because donors and NGOs learn from their mistakes from reporting, 
there is more room on how the relation can be more effective and create room for feedback and 
learning sessions. This can help improve the relation with NGOs. “Genuine processes of 
downward accountability are permanent, ongoing, and embedded in organizational culture” 
(Baur & Schmitz, 2007: 10). A focus on organizational learning offers an approach that is more 
constructive and positive than punitive approaches to accountability. It is through a scrutiny of 
failed projects, programs, and policies, that NGOs and donors stand to learn the most for 
improving development interventions. Partnerships that value an honest scrutiny of failure, 
built on trust rather than punishment, offer opportunities for achieving long-term effectiveness. 
Christensen & Ebrahim (2004) states that NGOs recognize that they have to be 
accountable to the people they help, also known as downward accountability. In this case, 
NGOs work effectively when they work closely with beneficiaries. Upward accountability 
means that donors wants to make sure that the money they invest is used effectively. Downward 
accountability can also “enhance buy-in among stakeholders, and thus long-term effectiveness” 
(ibid.: 6). Keystone Reporting (2006) researched the impact of downward accountability and it 
showed that both donors and NGOs think downward accountability is equally important (ibid.: 
4). However, in practice this differs. Donors value the quality of accountability more than 
NGOs. Reporting formats and information systems do not actively enable learning and 
improvement (ibid.: 4). In Keystone Reporting’s research, it is claimed that “donors can and 
should do more to help organizations become more accountable to their ‘beneficiaries’, while 
at the same time simplifying the bureaucratic burdens that are placed on NGOs” (ibid.: 4). 
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Currently, reporting tends to produce large amounts of data for donors that are not directly 
useful for learning and improving attainment of intended outcomes.  
 
2.3 Competition 
2.3.1. The obstacles of competition 
Competition in the development sector has increased, because there are more NGOs. Donor 
funding did not grow (Cornish, 2017). Cooley and Ron (2002) state that stronger competition 
makes NGOs value money-making more than pursuing their missions. Moreover, they put more 
time in obtaining funding, than being active in the field. Also, it eliminates the NGOs that have 
the least effective marketing strategy. This results in smaller NGOs facing more difficulty in 
accessing funding. Competition can eliminate the least effective NGOs, however “more is not 
always better and competition does not solely reduce waste” (Cooley and Ron, 2002).  
 An increasing competition can result in donors having a stronger position in setting up 
priorities and short-term demands. According to Parks (2008), local NGOs have to compete for 
less funding than international focused NGOs. Consequently, many NGOs have to close, and 
the ones that remains are more in line with donors’ priorities and interests (ibid.: 214). The 
result of eliminating of NGOs can also lead to the loss of good functioning NGOs that do not 
have the resources or the network to survive. The remaining NGOs can adapt easier to what 
donors prioritize. Nunnenkamer & Öhler (2011) explain that it is crucial for NGOs to form 
good bonds with their donors to get long-term funding (ibid.: 2). The long-term business models 
of development aid will require an ability among NGOs and donors to look critically and 
collectively at failures, and to find ways to improve them (ibid.: 2). 
 The increasing competition for NGOs leads to the marketization of funding. This can 
have negative influence on efficiency (Cooley and Ron, 2002). Applying for official funds 
discourages cost-saving cooperation among NGOs (ibid.: 17). Institutional funding is often 
connected to higher administrative costs and considerable paperwork (ibid.: 17). Other types of 
funding include: international financial institution, philanthropic foundations and multinational 
companies (Shiffman, 2006: 413). Moreover, Aldashev and Verdier (2009) state that local 
NGOs, which are not strongly represented, feel reluctant to apply for institutional funding 
(ibid.:200). Local NGOs can prevent disappearance in the competitive market if they cooperate 
with larger NGOs, but this can only happen if the larger NGOs are willing to work with smaller 
NGOs (Aldashev & Verdier, 2009: 200). “On the other hand, if the returns to scale in 
fundraising technology are not sufficiently strong, there are no multinationals in equilibrium, 
as no national NGO has an incentive to become multinational” (ibid.: 200). 
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2.3.2. The benefits of competition  
Parks (2008) states that competition between NGOs has a positive impact on NGO 
accountability and performance (ibid.: 218). Competition results in NGOs feeling the need to 
work harder, remove unneeded costs and it is made more difficult to misspend funds (ibid.: 
218). Increasing competition can also lead to more high-performing NGOs, and makes low-
performing NGOs disappear (ibid.: 218). Multiple authors state increasing competition to more 
efficient NGO performances (Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2010). When NGOs have obtained an 
efficient relation with their donors, that is built on mutuality, because they have found common 
goals. This can strengthen the identity of both the donor as well as the NGO (Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff: 255). “The opportunity to participate and influence equally means that each actor 
can more easily protect its organization identity and, hence, the efficiency, effectiveness, and 
synergistic rewards of the partnership” (ibid.: 255). Mutuality gives partner organizations the 
chance to explain their goals in the missions, which are necessary for the success of the 
partnership (ibid.: 255). It also creates the opportunity for partners that want to achieve the same 
goals. It is important that there is fairness and equity in the collaboration to maximize needs 
(ibid.: 255). Moreover, mutuality designs opportunities for partner organizations to develop 
their skills. It raises new ideas and creates more effective approaches (ibid.: 255). “In a 
competitive environment where donors have multiple options, maintaining positive perceptions 
of trustworthiness can prove decisive for NGOs, not only for the existence of any individual 
NGO, but also for the sector as a whole” (ibid.: 255). 
 Another positive aspect related to competition among NGOs, results in NGOs tending 
to cooperate more efficiently with other NGOs. Cooperation could specifically improve when 
NGOs are open to complement each other’s activities (Barr & Fafchamps, 2006).  It enhances 
innovation, new ideas and marketing opportunities.  
 
2.4 Dependency 
Dependency can be viewed from two different dimensions: vertical and horizontal dependency. 
Vertical dependency is based on single-issue development. Funding from donors goes to one 
specific goal. Vertical dependency focuses on a traditional donor-recipient relationship (van 
Tulder et al., 2011: 62). The dependency is described as consequential and heavily dependent 
on donors (ibid.: 62). Horizontal dependency tackles an entire field of development. It focuses 
on partnership with donors that wants “to encourage cooperation, prevent fragmentation and to 
create added value” (ibid.: 58). 
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2.4.1 Vertical Relation 
Even though ‘nongovernmental’ implies autonomy from government organizations, NGOs are 
often closely connected with their home governments (Fisher, 1997: 451).  “In the past, NGOs 
operated by challenging the system; present-day NGOs often operate as part of the system via 
mechanisms such as strategic alliances with business” (Nalinakumari & Maclean, 2005: 7). 
Because NGOs were undermining state hegemony, government agencies were set up to bring 
NGOs under control (Fisher, 1997: 451). Financially dependent NGOs are more tempted to 
secure their funding, through strategically targeting their programmes in less poor countries 
where “success is easier to achieve” (ibid.: 5).  
Dependency on donors is challenging, because of the shifting priorities of donors. Parks 
(2008) explains that NGOs become entangled in critical situations when donors shift to new 
priority areas and/or countries (ibid.: 214). According to Dreher, Nunnenkamp and 
Schmaljohann (2013) donors almost always have a trade-related interest and/or political 
motivation for investing in NGOs (ibid.: 4-5). NGOs can be reluctant to accept the conditions, 
because they can sometimes be used as “subcontractors who can be hired at will to clean up the 
institutional mess, after which Big Aid donors can move in and achieve nice results under 
conditions of good governance” (Koch et all., 2009: 903). This can leave NGOs in a dilemma. 
It is either keeping their priorities in order while having the risk of losing funding or adapting 
the new priorities of the donor with the chance of losing their identity (ibid.: 214). Berthélemy’s 
research on donor-behavior shows that most donors behave in a rather, what he calls, ‘egoistic 
way’ (2006: 192). Egoistic donors invest in aid where they solely seek self-interest (ibid.: 179). 
“Altruistic donors make aid decisions independently of the specific relation that may exist 
between the donor and the different recipients” (ibid.: 189). In order to secure financial sources, 
NGOs become dependent on donors. 
Parks (2008) explains that strong dependency on donor funding can affect the credibility 
and efficiency of NGOs (ibid.: 214). When donors set new priorities, NGOs feel forced to go 
along, because of the lack of alternative funding and to secure partnership (ibid.: 214). Resulting 
in NGOs losing autonomy from donors (ibid.: 214). Autonomy is important, according to 
Fowler (2017), because NGOs which benefit from autonomy are better in including a broader 
range of donors in their programmes (ibid.: 152). NGOs that lack autonomy are “representing 
donor interests above national interests, seriously damaging their credibility and effectiveness” 
(Parks, 2008: 214). As Viravaidya and Hayssen (2001) state: “NGO managers may be 
compelled to follow the money and allow donors to dictate the scope and direction of their 
activities, or else receive no funds at all” (ibid.:1). According to Parks (2008) the increasing 
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asymmetric relation makes it harder for NGOs to have autonomy (ibid.: 218). NGOs that follow 
the money have a higher chance of being accused of representing political and/or foreign 
agendas (ibid.: 218). Parks (2008) even claimed that “NGOs are the most negatively affected 
by asymmetric power relations and the volatility of donor funding: (ibid.: 218). If an NGO is 
too closely aligned with their donors it results in decline in effectiveness, because of a 
crumbling autonomy (ibid.: 218). 
 
2.4.2 Horizontal Relation: Creating Shared Value and Corporate Social Responsibility  
There are theories that claim that donors and especially businesses should be taken accountable 
for social aid. One of these theories is called ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. It focuses on 
taking resources from businesses and investing them in trying to do good in the world, for 
example: encourage recycling and give money to social causes (Moore, 2014: 4). Corporate 
Social Responsibility means that both NGOs and donors “must be accountable for the social 
impact of their activities.” NGOs that encourage Corporate Social Responsibility help 
companies to implement social impact in corporate behavior (Jamali & Mirshak, 2006: 254). 
Moreover, Corporate Social Responsibility covers the use of programs to implement social 
responsibility, and policies making to handle social and stakeholder interests (ibid.: 248). Some 
companies used NGOs to give “expertize, outreach and capacity to implement social projects 
(ibid.: 248). 
Porter and Kramer (2006) developed a follow-up theory on Corporate Social 
Responsibility that wants to include donors in policy-making, called ‘Creating Shared Value’. 
They state that the dependent relation is changing to a collaborating relation that seeks to create 
shared values. Shared value is about “policies and operating practices that enhance the 
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social 
conditions in the communities in which it operates” (ibid.: 6). Shared value focuses “on 
identifying and expanding the connections between societal and economic progress” (ibid.: 6). 
The difference between the two theories is that when NGOs apply Corporate Social 
Responsibility they focus on creating responsibility and awareness to donors and encourages 
them to be more involved in social issues. NGOs that apply Creating Shared Value focus on 
creating value for both the NGO and the donor. Donors have to create higher social value for 
their companies while making profit.  
Porter and Kramer (2006) explain that governments and NGOs are encouraged with 
Creating Shared Value to be more effective because they focus more achieved results than the 
spending of funds (ibid.: 6). NGOs are changing their organization with a better management 
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style. They include the importance of creating value. They need to create demand for their 
services, but at the same time not lose their credibility for the public eye.  
 Businesses and NGOs used to be in great contrast with each other on several aspects. 
Firms did not take externalities in mind, such as pollution. Social organizations responded to 
this, resulting in regulations and penalties. According to Porter and Kramer (2006) businesses 
expected that social problems where not their responsibility and that “solving social problems 
has been ceded to governments and to NGOs” (ibid.: 5). Businesses were urged to be involved 
in responsibility programmes to “improve firms’ reputations and to be treated as a necessary 
expense” (ibid.: 5). According to the authors, NGOs can bear the responsibility to add social 
value to businesses.  
 NGOs face difficulties in creating value. Businesses contribute to innovate new 
management styles and operating methods for NGOs. This leads to increasing productivity and 
expansion of their market (ibid.: 5). Businesses add a social value to their companies and NGOs 
add an economic value to their organizations. “The concept of shared value resets the 
boundaries of capitalism. By better connecting companies’ successes with societal 
improvement, it opens up many ways to serve new needs, gain efficiency, create differentiation, 
and expand markets” (ibid.: 7).  
Corporate Social Responsibility and Creating Shared Value create a new landscape. 
Resulting in more autonomy compared to a vertical dependent relation. Creating Shared Value 
in particular leaves space for NGOs and donors to work together, learn from each other and 
improve development aid (ibid.: 8). It can also create an increasing interdependency (Cabrera 
& Cabrera, 2002: 275). In this way, the relation changes from a dependent vertical relation to 
an interdependent horizontal collaboration (see figure 2). Creating Shared Value results to 
companies discovering new opportunities and innovations to apply in the traditional market 
(Porter & Kramer, 2006: 8). Creating Shared Value makes the traditional responsibilities 
between NGOs and donors disappear (ibid.: 12), because Creating Shared Value designs 
policies to create long-term partnerships, they expand to new markets (ibid.: 66). 
In a horizontal relation, NGOs have to find a common goal with donors to strive to 
social results. Two problems arise. First, social value is a subjective term and can be interpreted 
differently. Second, donors can search for short-term outcomes, because they are easier to 
achieve, while NGOs prefer long-term outcomes. Long-term goals can take years to achieve 
(ibid.: 16).  
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 TRADITIONAL ROLES NEW ROLES 
NGOS Receive funding to deliver social 
services 
Partner in implementing new 
shared value business models to 
donors 
GOVERNMENTS Regulate companies; operate 
social programmes 
Make platform investments and 
support shared value strategies; 
regulate to encourage shared value 
solutions 
COMPANIES Donate to charitable causes or 
ESG program 
• Partner with NGOs and 
government to initiate and scale 
shared value strategies 
• Partner with other companies to 
leverage impact in shared value 
 
Figure 2: Creating Shared Value. Adapted from Institute for Strategy & Competitiveness, Harvard 
Business School, 2018, https://www.isc.hbs.edu/creating-shared-value/csv-explained/Pages/new-role-
for-government-and-ngo.aspx  
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3. Methodology 
In this chapter, the selective research design and methodology will be discussed. The first 
paragraph explains the research type, followed by the research design. The second and third 
section justifies the qualitative research design and interviews. After that the variables, 
hypotheses and operationalization are discussed. Lastly, reliability and validity are reflected 
upon.  
 
3.1 Research Design 
This study is going to answer the research question: ‘What do Dutch NGOs see as the biggest 
challenge in the funding system with donors?’ To get to the answer, sub questions will be 
answered and hypotheses will be tested. The research has three conceptual variables: 
accountability, competition and dependency. Based on these concepts the following conceptual 
model is made (see figure 3). The interview questions collect data on these variables, used to 
answer the hypotheses and sub questions. Since they are all qualitative variables, they are only 
measureable by interview. To test the hypotheses still, the size of the NGOs has to be 
operationalized.  
 
Figure 3: Conceptual Model 
 
The hypotheses that will be answered in the findings are: 
• Hypothesis: 1.a. NGOs experience the effects of accountability more positive than 
negative. 
• Hypothesis: 1.b. The smaller the NGO the larger the negative effects of accountability. 
Getting funding
Accountability
Competition
Dependency
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• Hypothesis 2: Smaller NGOs are more affected by an increasing competition than 
larger NGOs because larger NGOs get more funding. 
• Hypothesis 3: NGOs prefer horizontal strategies over vertical strategies with their 
donors. 
 
The following variables used in the hypotheses are explicated: 
• Smaller NGOs: NGOs that have less than 100 active members working for the 
organization. 
• Larger NGOs: NGOs that have more than 100 active members working for the 
organization. 
• Challenge: The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘challenge’ as: ‘A call to someone to 
participate in a competitive situation or fight to decide who is superior in terms of ability 
or strength.’  
 
To answer the research question, a qualitative case study approach on Dutch NGOs was chosen. 
Semi-structured interviews with employees from Dutch NGOs were scheduled to gather data.  
Multiple cases help the research in gaining a broader sense of what NGOs experience as 
challenging in their (financial) cooperation with donors. The aim of the study is not to 
generalize, but to understand what different NGOs experience as challenging in their relation 
with donors.  
 Qualitative research focuses on interpretation from respondents’ perspective (De Vos 
and Vouché, 1998). A qualitative research design contributes to the data collected and the 
subjective experiences of the participants on the process of donor funding and their 
interpretation. Moreover, qualitative research suits to reveal unexpected affairs. In order to give 
answers to the research question and test the hypotheses, sufficient data needs to be collected 
from the respondents with experience in the field.  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
A total of twelve respondents were interviewed. Five of them work for larger Dutch NGOs 
(Oxfam Novib and Plan Nederland) and four work for smaller Dutch NGOs (JINC, Justice & 
Peace, Human Security Collective). Additionally, two respondents work for two large 
international NGOs (UN Women and Inclusivus). Lastly, one donor is interviewed from the 
Nederlandse Postcode Loterij. two out seven NGOs focused on Human Rights, two out of seven 
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NGOs’ main mission is poverty reduction, one NGO focused of empowerment, the other two 
NGOs aspire better rights for women and girls.   
The data is collected through semi-structured interviews with employees of NGOs. The 
standardized questions provide the opportunity to compare answers better. On the other hand, 
since all questions are open questions, follow-up questions are crucial for additional 
information. The combination of the two works best, resulting in a semi-structured interview 
technique. There is not a fixed order in questions. The questionnaires serve as a guideline for 
the interviews, leading is that the three topics are discussed. Johnson & Weller (2002) say that 
a non-judgmental attitude by the researcher encourages respondents to talk freely to the 
researchers. Bogdan & Taylor (1975) follow up and say that it is the researcher’s responsibility 
to create an open and comfortable setting for the participants to talk freely. The researcher did 
this by adapting to the wishes of the respondents, either by phoning on their preferred time or 
meeting them in a preferred private room. 
Prior to the interview, the interview questions were sent to respondents. Respondents 
could mention their preferred language before the interview started. Three interviews out of 
twelve were done in English. Nine out of twelve interviews were done in Dutch, to making it 
more comfortable for the Dutch-speaking respondents. The interviews were either done by 
interviewing in a private room or otherwise by scheduling the phone interview on their 
preferred time.  
The recordings of the Dutch interviews were transcribed in Dutch, the English 
interviews were transcribed in English. The researcher bears the privacy of the respondents in 
mind. Therefore, the respondents anonymously in the transcription and findings. The quotations 
of the Dutch interviews were translated to English. The interview from the respondent of 
Inclusivus was the only interview that is based on notes made during the interview due to 
technical eruptions.   
The interviews were structured according to the sub questions resulting from the 
literature review. The questions were based on the topics; accountability, competition and 
dependency. Keeping these topics in mind, the following interview questions were made: 
 
1. What is for your organization the biggest obstacle in the financial cooperation with your 
donors? 
2. What are the main benefits in the financial cooperation with your donors?  
3. How much does your NGO have to adapt to the donor’s values? 
4. How much do these conditions have an influence on your organization’s projects? 
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5. Is there something you would want to change in this relation? / What is your ideal 
relation between your NGO and the donor? 
6. Do you feel that working together with donors strengthen or weaken your organization?  
7. How can your NGO make sure that the predetermined goals are reached?  
8. Does the received funding always go to the predetermined goals?  
9. Do you experience that you have to account to your donors where their donated money 
goes to? What do you think about this? 
10. Does your organization refuse donors? If yes, when did this happen? If not, does your 
organization always agrees with the said conditions of the donors? 
11. Do you have to compete with other NGOs to get funding from the same donor? How 
can you make sure that your organization gets funding?  
 
3.3 Reliability 
To ensure the reliability of the research, a standardized questionnaire was used during the 
interviews. The interview questions were kept in a logical and chronological order. This ensured 
structure during the interviews. By using a standardized questionnaire, the same questions were 
asked during each interview, resulting in answers to be able to be compared. In addition, the 
same method was used for each interview. It started with an introduction, followed by an easy 
warming-up question and to end the interview with a summary where supplements could be 
given. Another measure to ensure reliability is to record all interviews after approval by the 
respondents. This reduces the chance of important data being lost. 
 
3.4 Validity and Generalizability  
To improve internal validity, the researcher took several actions. First of all, the interview 
questions were send prior to the respondent. Respondents had enough time to understand the 
questions and prepare their answers. Second, the researcher tried to create an environment 
where the respondents would feel comfortable. This was either done by interviewing in a private 
room or otherwise by scheduling the phone interview on their preferred time. On the other hand, 
the results are less valid, because NGOs have a dependent business relation with their donors, 
what might have the consequence that the respondents will not feel comfortable in expressing 
what the challenges in this relation are. This may have an impact on the credibility of the results. 
 This research also has problems with external validity. Since the results are not 
generalizable to other organizations or situations. This is due to a relatively small number of 
NGOs. The organizations differ too much in scale, missions and/or programmes. Also, 
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qualitative data interpretation may be influenced by the researchers’ subjectivity. This makes 
the research less transferable.  
 These shortcomings have been taken into account during the interpretation of the data 
and in the processing of results.  
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4. Findings 
This chapter discusses the findings of the research. The topics accountability, competition and 
dependency for NGOs in the relation with donors are discussed per subject. The related input 
from the interviews is first discussed, to conclude with analysis of the hypotheses. All the 
transcribed interviews can be found in the appendices.  
 
4.1. Accountability 
Accountability is considered as a key factor in the funding relation with donors according to all 
respondents. All respondents answered to the question ‘how do you experience accountability 
to donors?’ that accountability is a positive and self-evident process for NGOs. Eight out of 
eleven NGO respondents also expressed that transparency is key in the development sector for 
both donors as for the people in the field. Five out of these eight NGO respondents were 
working for larger NGOs. One respondent said about transparency: “In general it is a beneficial 
process. It is very important that we can justify our expenses. If we did not have these checks, 
it will damage the reputation of the NGO-industry.” Another respondent said: “transparency is 
very important and certainly in our sector, even if things go bad. If your relationship with your 
partner is good then you can justify the bad things as well.” Eight out of the eleven NGO 
respondents explained that it is key for the development-sector to justify why certain plans or 
programmes went wrong. Accountability processes are informative for NGOs as well. One 
respondent said: “That's how we learn. If things do not go as planned, we warn them what we 
did do wrong. How can we avoid doing it in the future? It's actually a very important part of the 
whole project.” 
Five out of eleven NGO respondents expressed the difficulties that they face towards 
donors at the moment that they have to justify that part of funding also pays the management 
and other related parts of the NGO. “You have to justify to your donors that 5 to 10 percent 
goes to management. We have to do that, otherwise we cannot fulfill the wishes of donors.” 
Another respondent expressed that “the donor has to be realistic. The funding has to go to 
employees and suppliers. […] If they do not agree on this, I will try my best to explain to the 
donor why it is important for the organization. If they don’t want that to happen, the funding 
stops. […] We usually do not have this problem because big donors know that this is part of 
the relation.” 
One respondent said that: “If you give something, you can expect something in return. 
The extent to how much we adapt to the donor and that it is still reasonable, is something that 
we discuss. In all markets, there is a shift to increasing accountability.” One international 
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respondent said that the financial process between donors and NGOs is becoming more 
bureaucratic than it used to be. “It has become more bureaucratic than when I started at UN 
Women around 1980. Of course, you had to write financial reports but nowadays every step 
matters in your report.” According to the same respondent from a larger NGO, the 
accountability process is harder for smaller NGOs than for larger NGOs. Three out of four 
respondents from smaller NGOs assents to this. Reporting and monitoring projects add big 
pressure on the organization. “As a small organization, it takes us days to write financial reports, 
the more donors we get, to more we have to monitor. Bigger organizations have departments 
that write these reports. We have to include this work in our programmes as well.” Six out of 
eleven NGO respondents said that reporting in the sake of accountability can be very time-
consuming. From these six respondents, two respondents were from larger NGOs and four from 
smaller NGOs. 
Notable is that four respondents expressed that the relation they have with the Nationale 
Postcode Loterij is an ideal relation. One respondent said that the Nationale Postcode Loterij 
has “relatively manageable conditions, and the financial reporting is relatively low.” 
“Accountability is increasing, but the Nationale Postcode Loterij and Ford Foundation do not 
want too many reports. This shows that they trust the organization.” Another respondent said 
that the Nationale Postcode Loterij “gives the organization annual funding. As an organization, 
we can decide for ourselves what we do with it. Most donors say what we have to do with 
specific funding.” 
The Postcode Loterij explained that they do not give restricted funding to NGOs. “In 
our agreements, we do not have any obligations to give funding. NGOs can mention us in their 
annual report and they have to account for it financially. NGOs have to write a report of the 
projects once a year. Besides that, we also think about how we can visualize the cooperation.”  
Institutional donors ask for more accountability from NGOs compared to other donors 
according to most of the respondents. Three out of five respondents from larger NGOs 
expressed that “institutional donors have a high accountability-expectation. They expect regular 
reports; your entire project management has to connect to their accountability wishes.” Three 
out of four respondents from smaller NGOs expressed that institutional donors are very time 
consuming, but said that “EU-subsidies can be hard, it is a lot of money and the application 
procedure is complex. However, the EU has high amount of funding, so it is very 
understandable. “Institutional funding is highly specific according to one respondent: “When 
we work together with an institutional donor accountability is a very precise process. It is tested, 
weight and we are allowed to charge an X-percentage to management.”  
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4.2. Competition 
Respondents all claim that NGO competition has increased over the last years. All respondents 
said that competition is something that has always been there and is a natural phenomenon 
when asking for funding. Another respondent expressed that the competition between NGOs is 
only growing stronger “the field has become more competitive, because there is more 
competition for donor funding.” 
  Nine out of eleven NGO respondents said that reputation and networking is key to not 
be affected by increasing competition. One respondent is that “reputation is key. If you deliver 
a good product, have a reputation that is known as high-quality and have a good network it will 
make your organization grow stronger.” Having a good reputation can bring benefits, one 
respondent explained that: “Having a good reputation can be a big advantage, also if the 
organization has known scandals. It easier for big NGOs to have a big network, that is different 
for new and smaller NGOs.” Another respondent said that: “Terribly important is your 
reputation. You have to build that up, go for quality, make good contacts.” Three out four 
respondents from smaller NGOs said that larger NGOs do have the advantage of a bigger 
network. “Networking is key because some donors and support organizations that are well 
known are easier to trust just because they have the name. So many donors have donated for 
example to NGO X. That makes it easier for them to trust them. We have a smaller NGO and 
you know that trust needs to be built. And that requires a lot of networking and also getting to 
know each other. Because in the end it's an investment.” 
Nine out of eleven NGO respondents said that networking is very important in reaching 
donors. A respondent from a larger NGO explained the importance of networking: “The 
funding that your organizations gets, is based on your own network. Our goal is to remain 
funding from our network. I do not feel that competition with other NGOs is affecting our 
organization. Most donors work together with your NGO for several years. If this is a solid 
partnership, it is difficult to change that. Also, big donors fund multiple NGOs at the same time. 
All in all, I do not feel that our organization is affected by competition.” Another respondent 
from the same large NGO said that “networking with major donors is the biggest benefit in our 
relationship with donors. If we deliver good results to a big network, then their network will 
hear about our good work.” 
One respondent from a smaller NGO said that larger NGOs have a bigger network: “There's 
always competition. Your vision is not a new thing. It has always been there. There have always 
been organizations that are bigger and have bigger networks compared to us. We always have 
to try to innovate. Once you innovate it doesn't matter how small or big you are.” 
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 The donor respondent states “The criteria we set up are clear, you have to comply with 
that. There is obviously a limit to how much money we can distribute that determines the 
number of organizations that we can support. Network is important. we chose carefully with 
whom we want to work together.” The respondent from an NGO said that “a good donor thinks 
along with you, you look at the same horizon. They invest time in you and that gives confidence. 
Also, good donors have experts that can contribute to the projects.” 
One respondent expressed that NGOs always feel competition because other NGOs are 
your con-colleagues. “Sometimes you work together and sometimes they work against your 
plans, that’s okay.” The same respondent explains that NGOs can feel competition in other 
fields as well “The thing is, when you work together with institutions and the public market, 
commercial parties becomes a competitor for your donor as well. In a lot of different areas, you 
encounter the commercial world, that is not bad, but it did change the landscape. There are still 
many NGOs and other companies asking for funding.” Moreover, three respondents from larger 
NGOs expressed that if they lose funding to another NGO, they accept this, because funding 
still goes to a good cause: “Of course you want donors to choose your organization, but if people 
chose an organization that focuses on health improvements or environmental issues, who are 
we to say that these organizations do not deserve the money? It still goes to a good cause.” 
 
4.3. Dependency 
Different questions were asked during the interviews to test whether NGOs feel dependent on 
donors. All the NGO-respondents said that there is an apparent logical dependency on donors. 
NGOs ask for funding from donors, which creates a form of one-sided reciprocity. NGOs need 
to deliver good results to the donor to give something in return. It is a donors’ choice whether 
they want to give to an organization or not.  
All respondents said that they do not change their main mission because of a donor’s 
demand. “We believe in our projects. We will not completely change that because a donor has 
certain prerequisites. But we are willing to adapt to small changes that add value to our 
projects.” One respondent explained that they sometimes adapt to donor’s values, only if it is 
in line with their main mission. “There are a lot of donors, and of course everyone has their 
own approach, their own thinking. We don’t change our vision or mission to adapt to donors’. 
Plus, donors can change their view for many reasons.” Another respondent expressed: “Usually 
we do not change our projects for a donor. We are not a service deliverer, we want to be 
autonomous and determine our own projects.”  
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According to one respondent from a larger NGO, they were not independent at first. “At 
the beginning, we were willing to change our conditions to the donor, especially institutional 
donors. […] Now we are willing to discuss what conditions we accept. This creates room for 
negotiations. […] When a donor offers large amount of funding, we are willing to see if their 
conditions fit the program. This does not necessarily mean that large amount of funding is equal 
to more involvement.”  
Another strategy that NGOs use to not be too dependent on one donor, is to include 
multiple donors in the process of funding. “It makes the organization more defensible because 
we are not dependent on one channel. We have a diverse fruit basket. But it also creates pressure 
on the organization. We have to approach every fruit in the basket differently. […] Diversity in 
different donor channels is a challenge for the organizations.” 
All respondents said that they hardly check individual donations, but when it comes 
down to business investments that an ethical inspection is required. On the question whether 
NGOs refuse funding the respondents were less in unison. Two respondents from a larger NGO 
said that they will not collaborate with parties that have a high chance of reputation damage for 
the organization. “We can always deny funding. […] You don’t want to collaborate with a 
donor that sustains war when our mission is to stop war.” One respondent said “if it we classify 
donor as risky it doesn’t mean that we might not go for it, but indeed we might also put extra 
measures in place. […] We would deny any if it is a bad deal for us because it is something that 
goes beyond something that we can deliver.” A respondent from a smaller NGO said that they 
do not refuse donors because “they don’t come knock on our door and be like, hey we want to 
work with you. […] We reach the donors that we want to work with. And there you can see if 
it is a good match.” Another respondent from a smaller NGO expressed that they only want to 
get involved with donors if it is a match for the organization. “We don’t have to deny funding, 
because we do not let it get that far.” 
 Furthermore, NGOs said that the relation is evolving and that NGOs are looking for 
creative solutions to be less dependent on donors. Five out of eleven NGO respondents say that 
they are willing to innovate their funding strategy, to get long-term funding from donors. Three 
out of these five said that they try to create shared value. Many NGOs see that donors want to 
learn from NGOs as well. The relation is changing more to an “equal” partnership relation than 
to a “dependent” donor relation. As one respondent from a larger NGO said: “In a donor relation 
you sit across each other, in a partnership you sit next to each other and look at the same 
horizon.” […] “We learn from them and they learn from us. But you have to really earn this. 
We are still in a dependent role and you want to get rid of that dependent role. You really want 
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to add value to those companies and that is something that we have to work on. We have to 
change the relation to a real collaboration, that is not only based on financial dependency.” The 
donor respondent expressed that: “The collaboration with NGOs is a win-win situation. It is 
pleasant when they think that too. We need good projects to show the world that we are a charity 
lottery. You can make each other better when you negotiate as equals.”  
A respondent from an NGO said that NGOs are adding more corporate value. “For 
instance, if a company makes a product it nowadays needs to be environmental friendly and 
free from child labor etcetera, NGOs can play a role in this to add societal value to the donor in 
form of partnerships.” According to two respondent the relation with donors nowadays is about 
creating shared values. “We look for companies in the field that we are interested in, and we 
will see who is active in that field, then we can create shared value. That is what you want to 
achieve, that you can complement each other.” 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Based on the data of the interviews, the following conclusions can be made: 
It can be concluded that NGOs see an apparent benefit in accountability. Most respondents said 
that accountability creates transparency, openness in the cooperation with their donors and that 
NGOs and donors have the opportunity to learn from each other. On the other hand, more than 
half of the respondents said that the process of accountability is very time-consuming. 
Especially when NGOs want to apply for funding from big institutional donors. Accountability 
also results in NGOs spending much time on jobs such as writing reports and monitoring the 
projects.  
 These critical views on accountability are more expressed by smaller NGOs than larger 
NGOs. This can be explained because it can take multiple days to finish reports, because a 
smaller NGO has less employees to work on these jobs than larger NGOs. Moreover, the data 
from the interviews showed that larger NGOs are more positive on accountability than smaller 
NGOs. More respondents from larger NGOs said that accountability brings transparency and 
therefore good cooperation with the donors. They all agreed that accountability is necessary for 
the cooperation with donors.  
Based on the data of the interviews, hypothesis 1.a. “NGOs experience the effects of 
accountability more positive than negative” can be confirmed. Even though NGOs are critical 
on the time-consuming, they all proclaim the importance of accountability and that it creates a 
better relation and more openness with donors. Hypothesis 1.b. “The smaller the NGO the larger 
the negative effects of accountability”, can also be confirmed. Based on the data of the 
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interviews, respondents from smaller NGOs were more critical on accountability, because of 
its bureaucratic nature and smaller amounts of resources. Also, larger NGOs were more positive 
on the benefits of accountability. This can be interpreted that accountability may be more 
beneficial towards larger NGOs than smaller NGOs. 
All respondents explained that competition is not a new phenomenon. Respondents all 
do express that competition between NGOs has increased. However, NGOs from both smaller 
and larger NGOs say that do not feel strongly affected by increasing competition. Not any 
respondent said that increasing competition results in eliminating their NGO or projects of the 
NGO. If they have a good reputation and network and have delivered good work, donors will 
continue to work together with that NGO. Also, if they lose funding to another NGO, they are 
not resentful about it, because it still goes to a good cause. 
On the other hand, respondents from smaller NGOs expressed that larger NGOs do have 
a bigger network and a better reputation. Networking is key in getting funding from donors. A 
good and well-known reputation creates that the NGO can permit more mistakes. If an NGO 
delivers good work and keeps the donor satisfied, the donor will remain to cooperate with the 
NGO. When larger NGOs can achieve this with their large network, it can make it difficult for 
smaller NGOs, that have a smaller network, to intervene.  
Therefore, the hypothesis 2 ‘Smaller NGOs are more affected by an increasing 
competition than larger NGOs’ can be rejected. First of all, based on the data of these findings, 
it does not seem that the NGOs feel affected by increasing competition. They can still perform 
their programmes and they still get funding from donors. Second, the data of the interviews 
shows that smaller NGOs do not feel affected by increasing competition, but more by larger 
networks of larger NGOs.  
Based on the findings in the interviews, NGOs do not experience dependency as a 
negative effect of donor funding. They do feel a certain amount of dependency on the donor. 
However, all respondents said that they have agency on what extent they adapt to donors. They 
are open to adapt small changes but not change an entire program for one donor. Moreover, 
NGOs say that they can deny funding if it is conflicting with their mission. Based on the data, 
it seems that NGOs do not experience a strong vertical relation with their donors. All 
respondents do express that they are dependent on their donors but not in a way that they cannot 
negotiate on the conditions. 
 On the other hand, only three out of eleven respondents said that they do this by creating 
shared value. Most NGOs express that they are exploring new strategies to be less dependent 
on donors. They try to decrease dependency by innovating their programmes, applying for 
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funding from multiple donors. Therefore, hypothesis 3 ‘NGOs prefer creating shared value 
more than being dependent on donors’ is rejected. The data is not evident to conclude that 
NGOs do prefer creating shared value over a dependent relation with the donors. Moreover, it 
seems that NGOs acknowledge dependency on donors, but the amount of dependency does not 
seem as vertical as described in the literature review. 
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5. Discussion  
This paper attempted to examine the challenges that NGOs experience in the funding relation 
with donors. The research focused on accountability, competition and dependency to answer 
the research question. Three hypotheses were formulated in the literature review, based on these 
three topics. To answer the research question, qualitative interviews were held with eleven 
respondents from different NGOs and one respondent from a donor organization. This chapter 
discusses the findings by comparing them to the existing literature and answers the hypotheses 
in more detail. It gives insight in the theoretical implications and practical implications. The 
last part discusses the limitations and gives recommendations for further research.  
 
5.1. Hypotheses: 
5.1.1. Hypothesis 1: Accountability 
 
1.a. NGOs experience the effects of accountability more positive than negative. 
1.b. The smaller the NGO, the larger the negative effects of accountability are.  
 
Accountability can take two different forms. The first form of accountability is about pressuring 
demands from donors to NGOs in reporting and monitoring the projects. The purpose of those 
reports is to make sure that NGOs act cost-efficient. The second form focuses on whether NGOs 
honor the commitments that the donors set. Accountability therefore can be experienced in two 
different levels. Different authors described accountability repeatedly as a positive 
development in the relation between donors and NGOs. The researcher expected that the 
benefits would outweigh the challenges in accountability. Based on the findings in this research 
both hypotheses 1.a. and 1.b. were confirmed.  
 Several authors state that accountability has a positive effect on NGOs’ performances 
(Edwards & Hulme 1996; Fowler, 1996; Najam, 1996).  Respondents from different NGOs 
explained the positive effects of accountability. The results from this research confirm 
hypothesis 1.a and are also in line with the results from the literature. Accountability brings 
openness, it gives the ability to NGOs and donors to learn from mistakes and it contributes to a 
better relation (Edwards & Hulme 1996; Fowler, 1996). On the other hand, respondents 
expressed the negative sides of accountability. They stated that accountability also brings high 
workload, because of high demands in reporting. 
This research showed that smaller NGOs could be negatively affected by increasing 
accountability. In general, smaller NGOs do not experience the notion of accountability as 
negative. Moreover, the respondents from smaller NGOs stated that accountability contributes 
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to positive developments in the cooperation with donors. However, writing reports and 
monitoring, create a high workload for NGOs. Compared to larger NGOs, smaller NGOs have 
more difficulty to finish the increasing demand for reports and monitoring of project for donors. 
Larger NGOs have more resources and employees to finish reporting and monitoring in time. 
Mawsdley, Townsend and Porter (2005) explain that smaller NGOs face more difficulties in 
applying new technical requirements. Overall, most respondents preferred a relation with 
donors who do not ask for much reporting and monitoring. Different authors explained that 
monitoring and reporting are too important to reduce, but as Covey (1996) states: NGOs want 
to work effectively. According to Lloyd (2005) increasing demand of reporting does not 
contribute to effectiveness. Thus, accountability has both negative and positive effects on 
NGOs. Based on the interviews; NGOs experience the effects of accountability more positive 
than negative. Although, the smaller the NGO, the greater the negative effects in comparison. 
The positive effects are similar for both types of NGOs. 
  One other aspect was not included in the research: trust. One respondent noted that trust 
is important in accountability. Authors Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter (2005) stated that the 
less trust there is from donors to NGOs, the more reports the donor demands from NGOs. 
Follow-up research could study if there is a relation between accountability and trust.  
 This research offers several theoretical implications based on the findings related to 
hypotheses 1.a. and 1.b. Accountability is overall a positive trend in the relation between donors 
and NGOs. On the other hand, accountability demands for a higher workload, which is 
especially negatively experienced by smaller NGOs. The challenge in practice for NGOs and 
donors lies in combining the benefits of accountability, while not losing effectiveness on 
projects. 
 
5.1.2. Hypothesis 2: Competition 
 
Smaller NGOs are affected more negative by an increase in competition than larger NGOs. 
 
The effects of increasing competition are mostly described in literature as negative for NGOs 
(Aldashev & Verdier, 2007). Therefore, it was expected by the researcher that the respondents 
of NGOs would be affected even more than larger NGOs. However, based on the findings, 
competition was seen as a natural phenomenon in the funding relation. The respondents stated 
that they did not experience competition as negative. Moreover, they explained that they could 
live with funding going to other NGOs with similar missions: as long as the funding goes 
somewhere. The hypothesis was therefore rejected. 
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Relating this finding to the theory, it explains the difference in opinion of authors on 
this topic. On the one hand, there are several arguments that express the negative effects on 
increasing competition: it eliminates ‘weaker’ NGOs and it pressures NGOs in achieving short-
term goals instead of long-term projects. On the other hand, there are several arguments for 
positive effects of increasing competition: it can force NGOs to work more effectively and lead 
to cost-savings. This research did not find these arguments. This could be due to the fact that 
no respondents from ‘weak’ NGOs were interviewed who already work effectively. 
Additionally, the findings showed that larger NGOs benefit from having a better 
reputation and bigger network than smaller NGOs. This creates an advantage in competition 
for larger NGOs. They can acquire more donor funding at multiple levels. Wallace (2004) states 
that larger NGOs have the resources to sustain a larger network by attending network meetings. 
The reputation of the NGO plays a major role in getting funding as well. NGOs that are well 
known have higher chances to be first approached by donors. Aldashev and Verdier (2009) 
state that reputation is key for NGOs in receiving funding. Moreover, Olegario (2017) expresses 
that having a good reputation is “more important for NGOs than for firms.” He describes that 
well-known NGOs are more able to cope with challenges and scandals. “Reputations are 
formed, sustained and rebuilt within networks of stakeholders. The reputation of an entity 
depends on its position within these networks, which can be open or closed. Reputation 
intermediaries can also affect the kind of information that travels through networks (ibid: 6).”  
This research could not implicate a bigger negative effect of an increasing competition 
on smaller NGOs, compared to larger NGOs. It did give some insights in the importance of 
reputation and networking. Further research on competition for donor funding should include 
the effects of reputation and networking and compare possible differences between smaller and 
larger NGOs.  
 
5.1.3. Hypothesis 3: Dependency 
 
NGOs prefer a horizontal relation to a vertical relation with their donors. 
 
Dependency is divided in vertical and horizontal dependency. Vertical dependency is a form of 
funding where the donor funds one specific goal of a NGO. It maintains a traditional donor-
NGO relation, where the donor gives funding to one goal, and the NGO has to deliver service. 
Horizontal dependency tackles an entire field and is based on a broad. Horizontal dependency 
can take different forms. The two described in the literature are: Social Corporate 
Responsibility and Created Shared Value. Created Shared Value strives to a relationship 
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between donors and NGOs where they both can contribute equally. Donors receive social value 
and NGOs financial value. Several questions in the interviews tested how respondents feel 
about donor-dependency. The researcher expected that NGOs would experience vertical 
dependency as negative and would strive towards a horizontal relation with donors. However, 
the data did not support these assumptions. The respondents from the NGOs expressed that they 
only adapt to donors on small issues. They also expressed that they stay true to their main 
mission when negotiating with donors. They do not set up an entire programme, just because a 
donor demands it. This contradicts to the existing literature on vertical dependency. Literature 
described a relation that is based more on a one-sided power relation coming from the donor. 
The findings in this research imply that NGOs have a stronger voice in the negotiation than the 
researcher expected. The results could be explained by the following reasons:   
 First, there is a chance that NGOs do not feel comfortable to admit that they adapt to the 
conditions of donors and thereby denying a vertical relation. Admitting could damage the 
relation with (future) donors as it could damage the credibility of NGOs.  
 Second, NGOs have more negotiation power than have been written about in the 
literature. As Bolton and Nash (2010) state, NGOs can reduce dependency by having a strong 
voice during the negotiations. “NGOs contribute most to such coalitions when they are able to 
present a unified front across a diverse range of civil society actors, when they are inclusive of 
and driven by those directly affected by the problem they are seeking to address and when they 
maintain some independence from their government and other donors (Bolton and Nash, 2010: 
172).” All respondents stated that they do not change their main mission when negotiating with 
donors on policy conditions. This could imply that NGOs are not as dependent on donors as the 
researcher expected.  
Third, donors prefer vertical dependency over horizontal dependency. Creating Shared 
Value emphasizes long-term cooperation with NGOs (Porter & Kramer, 2011). It could be 
argued that donors have a stronger interest in funding short-term goals. Social value is an 
objective that is difficult to achieve, define and measure (Mulgan 2010a). Especially for smaller 
and mid-large businesses, applying Creating Shared Value is an ambitious goal to achieve 
(Martin, 2011): “Small companies are planning ahead for that great day when you have 
millions, rather than hundreds of data points that can set you up for better shared value 
opportunities.”  
Moreover, the interviews implied that Creating Shared Value is not as popular as the 
researcher assumed. Creating Shared Value could be a theory that is still in the initial phase. As 
been said, Creating Shared Value is for smaller donors not easy to apply. This research showed 
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that the only two respondents from NGOs that were striving to Creating Shared Value, were 
respondents working for larger NGOs. Larger NGOs might have more resources to implement 
Creating Shared Value, compared to smaller NGOs. Larger NGOs have a larger network, so 
they can approach bigger companies easier to create shared value. 
Another explanation can be that NGOs who do not strive for Creating Shared Value do 
not want to be as strongly involved with different companies and lose autonomy. NGOs that 
implement Creating Shared Value have to work closely with the partnering donor. Still, NGOs 
do not want to be closely associated with certain companies that could damage their own 
reputation. Moreover, donors still have the upper hand in the funding-relation between donors 
and NGOs. There is no guarantee that when Creating Shared Value is implemented, that this 
power relation disappears, since donors the ones that are still contributing NGOs financially.   
Another possibility could be that donors do not want to create shared value with NGOs. 
Baur and Schmitz (2011) imply that business donors are too powerful in the relation with 
NGOs. They state that it is difficult for NGOs to suggest Creating Shared Value, because of the 
power relation between the actors. Social value is hard to measure and is a subjective term. This 
makes it more difficult for NGOs to give the donor something with the same value as the 
received financial support. 
This research shows that NGOs do not implement form of horizontal dependency to 
prevent vertical dependency as was expected by the researcher. Moreover, it shows that NGOs 
do not experience vertical dependency as negatively as expected. Future research could focus 
on why NGOs should apply Creating Shared Value and how they view this theory. The 
theoretical implications of this hypothesis show that dependency is a broad concept in the 
donor-NGO funding relation. Also, the notion of vertical dependency is fluid and can mean 
what the NGO wants it to mean. Future research could study the notion of both vertical and 
horizontal dependency broader. 
 
5.2. Theoretical Implications  
The main theoretical implications were discussed per hypotheses in section 5.1. The research 
provides new insights on challenges for NGOs. Within the topics of accountability, competition 
and dependency, new perspectives were discovered, such as the importance of networking, the 
strive towards Creating Shared Value and the impact of demanding accountability. Articles on 
donor funding and NGOs are still evolving. The notion on donors and NGOs are sensible for 
social and global change. The research can add to a present overview on how NGOs experience 
the funding relation with donors. The research is in line with existing literature, that also could 
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not give an unambiguously result on the biggest challenge for NGOs in the funding relation 
with donors. 
Many authors wrote about the donor-NGO relation from the NGO perspective. 
However, it lacks articles about this relation from a qualitative perspective. Also, not many 
articles have focused on how NGOs ‘experience’ accountability, competition and dependency 
in the relation with donors. Therefore, this research chose for a personal qualitative approach 
instead of a quantitative survey. This research provides a small overview of what Dutch NGOs 
experience as challenging in the NGO-donor relation. The research can be used as a starting 
basis for future researches.  
 
5.3. Practical Implications 
Based on the findings of the hypotheses, there are no unambiguously practical implication that 
could directly benefit the funding relation between donors and NGOs. However, when focusing 
on the details, the research could contribute to a better understanding of the challenges between 
NGOs and donors in the funding relation. Also, the research provides findings that agree and 
disagree with existing literature.   
The research could add purpose to NGOs. First, the research shows that NGOs can 
experience the same challenges with donors. If NGOs would follow-up on the findings of the 
research, NGOs could benefit in creating a better work environment for themselves and work 
together better with other donors. Moreover, the research could bring new insights to NGOs to 
understand how to improve cooperation with donors, such as to implement Creating Shared 
Value, improve networking and build a reputation.  
The research could contribute to donor organizations, to understand the challenges that 
NGOs experience in the funding relation. The research indicates how the NGOs experience the 
cooperation, the possibilities and the problems. These findings can give donors an idea of the 
cooperation from the NGO perspective. It could open new chances for donors to work together 
with NGOs to understand what the possibilities are and what the challenges in the relation are.  
 
5.4. Limitations & Recommendation Follow-up Research 
The research has several limitations that have to be taken in mind. The first limitation of this 
research was the scale. Eleven respondents were interviewed from different NGOs and one 
donor organization. This made it difficult to make conclusions on the data without generalizing. 
Future research could expand with more respondents from different NGOs ranging from small 
to large to make more valid conclusions. The study is intended as an explorative research on 
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the funding relation between NGOs and donors. The research choses a qualitative research to 
study the experiences of NGOs on the donor funding. Future research could use this study as a 
starting point for follow-up research on the topic. Another option could be to include a 
quantitative method to have a broader range of results.  
 The second limitation was that NGOs might not feel comfortable to speak freely about 
the funding relation with donors. NGOs are dependent on donors to get funding. The researcher 
asked questions on sensitive data of the organizations. Even though the researcher kept the 
interview anonymously, this could result that respondents from NGOs would not want to make 
statements that could harm future cooperation with donors. 
The third limitation of the research was that only one donor was interviewed for the 
data. The initial research question focused on the perspective of donors as well. The researcher 
had access to several NGOs to do the interviews. They expected a snowball effect on getting 
more respondents from both NGOs and donors. NGOs were more willing to do interviews on 
this subject. Donors were harder to approach. Therefore, the researcher decided to focus fully 
on NGOs, with an exception of one respondent from a donor organization. Future research 
could apply the same research, but with a focus on donors. 
 Another limitation in the research was that the majority of the interviews were held in 
Dutch. The transcriptions from the Dutch interviews were written in Dutch. The quotations 
used in the findings, were translated to English. The translated version of the quotations of the 
interviews could be lost in translation and be based on interpretation. 
 Future research could focus on possible causal relations between networking, 
reputation, workload on accountability and the ‘difficulties’ of Creating Shared Value. 
 Moreover, future research could apply this form of research in a non-Western 
perspective to show if the findings from this research differ from non-Western NGOs. Also, 
future research could study if NGOs, that have a certain thematic or mission, view the donor 
relation differently to other NGOs.  
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6. Conclusion 
This research gives answer to the question: ‘What do Dutch NGOs experience as the biggest 
challenge in the funding system with donors?’ Qualitative research was used with a case study 
approach to explore what NGOs experience as challenges in the relation with donors. 
Interviews with employees of different NGOs provided the data for this research. The research 
focused on accountability, competition and dependency as challenging factors in the 
relationship between NGOs and donors.  
NGOs consider accountability as a crucial element for a good relationship with donors. 
Accountability creates more transparency between the donors and NGOs and requires 
responsibility from both NGOs and donors. Accountability has increased on NGO activities. 
Donors demand more reporting and monitoring in NGO projects. Especially institutional 
donors expect more reporting on the spending of the funds and the achievement of 
predetermined goals. Smaller NGOs have less resources and employees to finish reporting and 
monitoring in time than larger NGOs. NGOs prefer a relation with donors that do not constantly 
demand reporting. That would give them more freedom to perform their programmes. 
Before NGOs reach the process of accountability they have to compete with other NGOs 
to get funding from a donor. Competition is not a new phenomenon in the field. Remarkably, 
losing funding to other NGOs is not seen as a negative result. However, NGOs do experience 
a certain amount of competition in networking and reputation. NGOs need a strong and big 
network to be able to apply for donor funding. A positive reputation contributes in donors 
wanting to work again with the NGO in the future. Small NGOs realize that in many cases they 
do not have a large network and are therefore experiencing more difficulties in claiming 
available funding.  
Similar to competition, NGOs experience dependency on donors as a natural 
phenomenon in the funding relation. Dependency can be horizontal and vertical. NGOs do not 
experience vertical dependency, or at least they do not consider this a negative outcome. NGOs 
claim that they approach the donors in whom they are interested in themselves to cooperate 
with. The donors, who are approached, generally fit these objectives. On the other hand, donors 
can change their policies and set different priorities, which results in that NGOs may have to 
adapt to (mostly small) changes. NGOs do experience that the funding relation with donors is 
a negotiating where they have a voice too. Some NGOs strive to implement Creative Shared 
Values in the relation, so the collaboration is not only about finances, but also about the donor 
contributing to the implementation of projects. Even though the theory suggests benefits for 
both donors and NGOs, this approach has not been aimed for in practice. 
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In conclusion, what do Dutch NGOs experience as the biggest challenge in the funding 
system with donors? The research did not find one clear evident answer on what is considered 
as the biggest challenge for NGOs in the funding relation with donors. However, based on the 
data in the findings, most respondents from different NGOs expressed that they experience 
accountability as the most challenging out of the three topics. The notion of accountability is 
not considered as a negative result, but the time-consuming element and demanding 
requirements of reporting are challenging parts of accountability. In particular, smaller NGOs 
do not benefit from this development. NGOs would experience the relation with donors as less 
challenging if they did not have to put so much time in writing reports. Both parties will keep 
asking the question: what is in it for us? Whether is social value or financial value. 
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